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Abstract
An examination of the impact in the US and EU markets of two major innovations
in the provision of air services on thin routes - regional jet technology and the low-cost
business model - reveals signicant di¤erences. In the US, regional airlines monopolize a
high proportion of thin routes, whereas low-cost carriers are dominant on these routes in
Europe. Our results have di¤erent implications for business and leisure travelers, given
that regional services provide a higher frequency of ights (at the expense of higher fares),
while low-cost services o¤er lower fares (at the expense of lower ight frequencies).
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1 Introduction
The availability of air transportation services has a sizeable impact on regional economic growth
and airport activities generate a considerable number of jobs (ACI-Europe, 2004; ICAO, 2004).1
Furthermore, several papers have shown that rms location decisions are inuenced by the
quality of air services (Button et al., 1999; Brueckner, 2003; Bel and Fageda, 2008), while the
majority of tourists originating from distant destinations travel by plane.
Against this background, the liberalization of air transportation services has been deemed
a successful experience both in the United States and Europe, because it has increased airline
competition. As a result, travelers today enjoy lower fares, higher ight frequencies, and more
alternatives on many routes, especially on those with high tra¢ c density. The implications
for travelers of this accrued competition have attracted a great deal of attention. But as the
empirical literature on airline competition has tended to focus on dense markets, it is still
unclear whether thin-route travelers have also beneted from market liberalization.2
The presence of density economies characterizes the airline industry (Caves et al., 1984;
Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Berry et al., 2006), which means that competition on thin routes
is unlikely as cost minimization will typically result in just one airline o¤ering a service. Several
papers have conrmed that tra¢ c density is one of the main determinants of airline entry deci-
sions (Johnson, 1985; Joskow et al., 1994; Dresner, Windle and Yao, 2002; Schipper et al., 2003;
Oliveira, 2008). The lack of competition is especially relevant on thin routes where alternative
transportation modes (i.e., bus, train or car) cannot o¤er an e¢ cient service. Bilotkach et al.
(2010) show that intermodal competition is only relevant in Europe on routes that are shorter
than 400 miles.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the provision of air services on thin routes in the US and
the EU. To conduct this analysis, emphasis should be placed on two recent major innovations
which may have a¤ected substantially air services on thin routes: regional jet technology and
the low-cost business model. The development of regional jets represents a major technologi-
1The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) estimates that about 4:5% of the worlds GDP is
attributable to air transportation and its e¤ects upon industries providing either aviation-specic inputs or
consumer products. In simple terms, every US $100 of output produced and every 100 jobs created by air
transportation trigger an additional demand of US $325, and 610 jobs in other industries (information from the
ICAO circular 292-AT/124, 2004).
2Since Borensteins (1989) seminal work, many studies have examined the inuence of competition on airline
fares. To the best of our knowledge, only Starkie and Starrs (1984) for Australia, Bitzan and Chi (2006) for the
United States, and Fageda (forthcoming) for Spain, analyze the factors that determine fares on thin routes.
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cal innovation as these aircraft can provide higher-frequency services on longer routes than is
possible with turboprops; and the emergence of a low-cost business model represents a signif-
icant managerial innovation, making it possible to o¤er seats at lower fares (with lower ight
frequency) for any distance range.
A review of the literature fails to clarify whether regional and low-cost connections are used
by airlines on thin routes. A small number of papers have analyzed the use of regional aircraft
(either turboprops or regional jets) in the airline industry. Brueckner and Pai (2009) nd
that regional jets are mostly used by airlines to feed hub airports. In a similar vein, Dresner,
Windle and Zhou (2002) nd that regional jets are mainly used on new hub-to-spoke routes
(i.e., routes that are longer than those served by turboprops), and appear to increase demand
on dense routes where they replace turboprops. As for the provision of air services by low-cost
carriers,3 Bogulaski et al. (2004) nd that Southwest tends to provide services on dense routes.
In an analysis of the market between the United Kingdom and continental Europe, Gil-Moltó
and Piga (2008) show that entry (and exit) of airlines such as British Airways, Easyjet, and
Ryanair is more likely to occur on dense routes.
By means of a simple theoretical model, we show that airlines tend to o¤er lower fares and
frequencies on thinner markets. However, airlines can also charge higher fares as they increase
ight frequency. Thus we observe that, for a given demand, regional airlines can o¤er higher
frequencies at higher fares, while low-cost airlines may try to take advantage of the economies
of tra¢ c density by using large aircraft with higher load factors.
In addition, we draw on data for a large number of monopoly point-to-point routes in the
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) to identify the inuence of route character-
istics (i.e., distance, tra¢ c density, and proxies for the proportion of leisure travelers) on the
likelihood of services on thin routes being provided by either regional airlines or low-cost carri-
ers. The US and the EU airline markets have di¤erent characteristics because the US market is
more mature, having undergone a marked consolidation with a small number of airlines o¤ering
services, whereas the EU market is more fragmented and unstable with many airlines o¤ering
services in di¤erent countries. Furthermore, the mean route distance is notably higher in the
US than it is in the EU.
We nd that the advantages of regional jets on medium-haul routes are fully exploited in
the US, while the use of regional jets is markedly lower in the EU. Low-cost airlines operate
3The literature focuses on the e¤ect on prices, nding that entry of a low-cost carrier on a particular route
tends to reduce fares. See, for instance, Gaggero and Piga (2010), Fageda and Fernández-Villadangos (2009),
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Morrison (2001), and Dresner et al. (1996).
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similarly to network airlines in the US in terms of route choices because both types of airline
prefer high-density routes, whereas European low-cost airlines dominate routes with a lower
number of seats. As a consequence, we nd evidence of very di¤erent models for the provision
of air services on thin routes in the US and European markets, respectively. While in the
US thin routes are mainly served by regional carriers, in Europe they are mainly operated by
low-cost airlines.
Clearly, these results have di¤erent implications for business and leisure passengers. On
the one hand, regional services are especially convenient for business passengers as they allow
airlines to o¤er a higher frequency and, moreover, ights are typically provided at airports
located close to city centers. On the other hand, low-cost services with mainline jets are more
convenient for leisure passengers as fares are lower, although this is typically at the expense
of a lower ight frequency and, in some cases, ights are provided at airports located some
distance from the city center.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our theoretical model is introduced in Section
2 and our main empirical ndings are presented in Section 3. For readers uninterested in the
theoretical illustration, Section 2 can be passed over without any loss of continuity. Section 4
o¤ers our conclusions. Proofs of the theoretical model are provided in Appendix A and some
additional empirical material is available in Appendix B.
2 The theoretical model
Airlines use di¤erent aircraft and business models depending on the characteristics of each city-
pair market (and market size is an important element). We consider a monopoly model based
on the analysis conducted by Bilotkach et al. (2010) to study airline services in thin markets.
The main novelty of our analysis lies in the extension of this model to consider market size, so
that we can conduct a comparative-static analysis to examine the e¤ect of thin markets.
Our model is based on indirect utilities of heterogeneous travelers choosing between sched-
uled services and not traveling at all (i.e., opting to stay at home). We consider a monopoly
air carrier as the provider of scheduled services, a choice that is realistic on many thin routes
where alternative transportation modes are not available.4
4Bilotkach et al. (2010) study the e¤ect of the competition between air travel and personal transportation,
which occurs when route distance is su¢ ciently low. Flores-Fillol (2009) considers an outside option that can be
interpreted as an alternative transportation mode, and analyzes the e¤ect of having either fully-served markets
or partially-served markets depending on the cost of the outside option.
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In the model, utility for a consumer traveling by air is given by Consumption   Schedule
delay disutility + V alue of available time. Consumption is y   pair where y is the common
level of income and pair is the airlines fare.
Letting H denote the time circumference of the circle, consumer utility then depends on
expected schedule delay (dened as the di¤erence between the preferred and actual departure
times) which equals H=4f , where f is the number of (evenly spaced) ights operated by the
airline. The Schedule delay disutility is equal to a disutility parameter  > 0 times the
expected schedule delay expression from above, thus equaling H=4f = =f , where   H=4.
We assume that all passengers value frequency equally and thus the parameter  is common
for all of them. Passenger heterogeneity emerges here through travelersvalue of time, as is
explained below.
Finally, the available time at the destination is computed as the di¤erence between the
passengers total trip time (T ) and the actual traveling time which depends on the distance
between the origin and the destination (d) and the planes speed (V ), thus equaling T   d=V .
We assume a large enough T so that T > d=V . Thus, taking into account the travelers
specic value of time , the V alue of available time at the destination equals  (T   d=V ),
where  is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range [0; 1]. Consequently, consumer
population size equals 1. However, thin markets are characterized by a lower potential demand
and less heterogeneity across passengers. Therefore, to model thin markets we assume that
only consumers with  2 (; 1  ) can undertake air travel, where 0 <  < 1
2
. The parameter
 measures the density of the market, so that larger values of  denote less dense markets (i.e.,
thinner markets). When  = 0, we have the densest possible market with a unitarian demand;
and as ! 1
2
, we move towards the thinnest possible market with 0 density.
Hence, utility from air travel is
uair = y   pair   =f +  [T   d=V ] . (1)
Consumers can also choose not to travel and stay at home, obtaining a utility of uo = y.
Disregarding the trivial cases (either where nobody travels or where everyone ies), a consumer
will undertake air travel when uair > uo, and this inequality holds with
 =
pair + =f
T   d=V . (2)
Thus, consumers with a su¢ ciently high value of time will undertake air travel and con-
sumers with a su¢ ciently low value of time will stay at home, as represented in Fig. 1.
 Insert Fig. 1 here 
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From Eq. (2), demand for air travel is given by
qair =
Z 1 

d = 1     = 1    pair + =f
T   d=V , (3)
where we observe that thinner markets have a lower demand.
To characterize the equilibrium in fares and frequencies, we need to specify the carriers
cost structure. As in Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2011), the number of ight departures is given
by f = qair=n, where n is the number of passengers per ight. Both aircraft size and load factor
determine the number of passengers per ight, which is given by n = ls, where s stands for
aircraft size (i.e., the number of seats) and l 2 [0; 1] for load factor. It is assumed that n is
an airline choice variable whose value is determined residually once qair and f are known. For
a given demand level, increasing either the load factor or aircraft size implies a lower ight
frequency.5
Aights operating cost is given by  (d)+n, where the parameter  is the marginal cost per
seat of serving the passenger on the ground and in the air, and the function  (d) stands for the
cost of frequency (or cost per departure).  (d) captures the aircraft xed cost, which includes
landing and navigation fees, renting gates, airport maintenance and other airport-related costs.6
We assume that  (d) is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to d > 0 and that (d) > 0
because fuel consumption increases with distance. Further, to generate determinate results,
(d) is assumed to be linear, i.e., (d) = d with a positive marginal cost per departure  > 0.7
Note that the cost per passenger, which can be written d=n +  , visibly decreases with
n capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies from serving a larger
number of passengers on a certain route), the existence of which is beyond dispute in the airline
industry. In other words, having a larger tra¢ c density on a certain route reduces the impact
on the cost associated with higher frequency.
Therefore, the airlines total cost is C = f [d+ n] and, using n = qair=f , we obtain
C = df + qair. The airlines prot is air = pairqair   C, which can be rewritten as
air = (pair   ) qair   df , (4)
5Although an airline may decide to decrease load factor to increase frequency, some previous papers consider
load factor not to be a choice variable and assume a 100% load factor (see Brueckner, 2004; Brueckner and
Flores-Fillol, 2007; Brueckner and Pai, 2009; Flores-Fillol, 2009; Flores-Fillol, 2010; and Bilotkach et al., 2010).
6Although the cost of fuel is not a cost per departure, it may also be included in this category since it
increases with distance.
7Since fuel consumption is higher during landing and take o¤ operations, (d) < 0 might be a natural
assumption. Assuming a concave function of the type (d) = dr with r 2 (0; 1) would have no qualitative
e¤ect on our results.
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indicating that average variable costs are independent of the number of ights.
After plugging Eq. (3) into Eq. (4) and maximizing, we can compute the rst-order
conditions @air=@pair = 0 and @air=@f = 0. From these conditions, it is easy to obtain the
following expressions
pair =
(1  )(T   d=V )  =f + 
2
, (5)
f =

(pair   ) 
d(T   d=V )
1=2
. (6)
On the one hand, Eq. (5) shows that fares rise with market density, passengerstotal time,
variable costs and the aircrafts speed, and fall with schedule delay and distance. Note that
ying becomes less attractive over longer distances and that the airline seeks to compensate this
negative e¤ect by lowering fares. On the other hand, Eq. (6) indicates that frequency increases
with passengersdisutility of delay, carriers margin (pair  ) and the aircrafts speed, whereas
it decreases with the cost of frequency and passengerstotal time. The e¤ect of distance on
f is also negative for d < TV=2, which is always the case for su¢ ciently large values of T .
As in Bilotkach et al. (2010), the second-order conditions @2air=@p2air; @
2air=@f
2 < 0 are
satised by inspection and the remaining positivity condition on the Hessian determinant is
pair    > 4f .
By combining Eqs. (5) and (6), we obtain the following equilibrium condition
2d(TV   d)

f 3| {z }
Cf
= [(1  )(TV   d)  V ] f   V| {z }
Lf
. (7)
The equilibrium frequency is shown graphically in Fig. 2, as in Bilotkach et al. (2010),
where we observe that the f solution occurs at an intersection between a cubic expression
(Cf ) and a linear expression (Lf ) whose vertical intercept is negative. The slope of Lf 
must be positive for the solution to be positive and thus we assume that  is small enough for
this to be the case. We observe that there are two possible positive solutions, but only the
second one satises the second-order condition.8
 Insert here Fig. 2 
Looking at Eq. (7) together with Fig. 2, we can carry out a comparative-static analysis for
all the parameters in the model. Although some e¤ects do not seem trivial from inspection of
8Observe that for the second intersection to be relevant, the slope of Cf must exceed the slope of Lf,
i.e., 6d(TV d) f
2 > (1   )(TV   d)   V . Using (5) and (6), this expression reduces to pair    > 4f , which
is exactly the condition required by the positivity of the Hessian determinant.
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Eq. (7), the proposition below ascertains the overall e¤ect by analyzing the sign of the total
di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to each parameter (see Appendix A for
details).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium ight frequency decreases as markets become thinner (i.e., as
 increases). It also falls with the cost per departure (), the marginal cost per seat () and
route distance (d). However, the frequency rises with the disutility of delay (), passengers
total time (T ), and the planes speed (V ).
Thinner markets (i.e., markets with larger values of ) are characterized by a lower demand
for air travel and, as a consequence, airlines schedule fewer ights. When either the cost per
departure () or the marginal cost per seat () increases, frequency falls since air travel becomes
less competitive. Flight frequency also decreases with distance (d), which is a natural outcome
when there is no competition from alternative transportation modes, conrming the results in
Bilotkach et al. (2010), Wei and Hansen (2007), and Pai (2009). We observe a positive e¤ect
of  on f  since carriers increase frequency as passengersdisutility of delay increases. When
passengerstotal time (T ) rises, more passengers are willing to undertake air travel since the
utility of ying increases and, as a consequence, the equilibrium frequency increases. Finally,
when the planes speed increases (V ), we observe the same e¤ect as with T , i.e., the valuation
of air travel increases and thus the equilibrium frequency rises.
To ascertain the e¤ect on fares, Eq. (5) shows that some parameters have a direct e¤ect
on fares, and that there is also an indirect e¤ect through ight frequency. The indirect e¤ect
comes from the positive relationship between fares and frequencies, since a higher service quality
typically implies a higher fare. The corollary below summarizes these e¤ects.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium fare decreases as markets become thinner (i.e., as  increases).
It also falls with the cost per departure () and route distance (d). However, fares rise with
passengerstotal time (T ) and the planes speed (V ). The e¤ects of the marginal cost per seat
() and the disutility of delay () are ambiguous.
The direct e¤ect of , d, T , and V on pair reinforces the indirect e¤ect through ight
frequency, and yields the natural result that higher frequencies result in higher fares. In the
case of , there is no direct e¤ect because it does not appear in Eq. (5), and thus it only a¤ects
fares through ight frequency. Finally, in the cases of  and  there is a conict between the
direct and the indirect e¤ects. An increase in  has a positive direct e¤ect and a negative
indirect e¤ect on fares. A priori, if the airline becomes more ine¢ cient, it has to increase
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fares. However, this increase in costs may also imply a fall in ight frequency since air travel
becomes less competitive, which yields lower fares. A rise in  has a negative direct e¤ect
and a positive indirect e¤ect on fares. The reason is that, if passengers become more sensitive
to schedule delay, the airline will have to lower fares unless it chooses to compensate for this
increased sensitivity to schedule delay by o¤ering a better service quality. The aforementioned
comparative-static analysis for fares and frequencies is recapitulated in Table 1 below.
 Insert Table 1 here 
The comparative-static analysis reported above suggests that fares and frequencies are lower
in thinner markets. Nevertheless, there are substantial di¤erences across thin markets. An
explanation for this can be found by considering the type of aircraft and business model adopted
by airlines in each market. In particular, fares and frequencies are typically higher on routes
served by regional aircraft (for a given number of total seats), whereas they are typically lower
on routes operated by low-cost carriers.
Regional jet technology (which has made the use of regional aircraft on relatively long
routes widespread) and the low-cost business model constitute two recent innovations in the
airline industry that have been implemented by carriers to discriminate better between business
and leisure passengers. Business passengers are characterized by their high disutility of delay,
whereas leisure travelers are more fare sensitive, i.e., B > L, where subscript B stands
for business travelers and subscript L denotes leisure passengers. As a consequence, a higher
proportion of business travelers on a certain route should create incentives for airlines to increase
ight frequency.
Since airport-related costs are lower for smaller aircraft, regional jet aircraft incur lower costs
per departure than mainline jets used by low-cost carriers, i.e., RJ < LC , where subscript RJ
stands for regional jet services and subscript LC denotes low-cost services. However, costs per
passenger are clearly higher for regional jet services than they are for low cost services, i.e.,
RJ > LC .
In addition, for a given demand level, increasing either the load factor or aircraft size implies
a lower ight frequency since f = qair=n and n = ls. By increasing frequency (which implies
either a smaller aircraft size or a lower load factor), airlines provide a higher-qualityproduct
and reduce passengersschedule delay, but they incur an extra cost of departure. However,
by decreasing frequency (which implies either a larger aircraft size or a higher load factor),
they reduce the cost per passenger because of the presence of economies of tra¢ c density. This
trade-o¤ is solved very di¤erently depending on the service provided by the airline. On the one
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hand, regional carriers may prefer to use small aircraft (either turboprops or regional jets) and
even lower load factors to be able to o¤er a higher frequency of service, and having a low cost
per departure (RJ) helps in adopting such a strategy. On the other hand, low-cost carriers try
to achieve low airfares by making use of mainline jets with a high load factor at the expense of
o¤ering a lower ight frequency.
Taking into account the above analysis, we can better understand the provision of air
services in thin markets. At rst glance, we observe that thinner routes yield lower frequencies.
In addition, the higher cost per passenger of regional jet aircraft could make regional services
inappropriate on these routes. However, when the proportion of business travelers is high, ight
frequency becomes an important market attribute and regional services may be better. Regional
aircraft are smaller, have a lower cost per departure, and can o¤er higher ight frequency at
higher fares (even at the expense of a lower load factor). By contrast, when the proportion of
leisure travelers is high, passengers are fare-sensitive and prefer lower fares (at the expense of
poorer frequencies). In this case, low-cost airlines may try to take advantage of the economies
of tra¢ c density by using large aircraft with higher load factors.
The empirical analysis that follows, provides a more thorough analysis of the use of regional
and low-cost services on thin routes, and identies interesting di¤erences between the US and
European markets.
3 The empirical model
In this section, we conduct an empirical analysis to examine which type of airline service is
being o¤ered on thin routes in the US and the EU. First, we explain the criteria used in selecting
the route sample and describe the variables used in the empirical analysis. Then, we examine
the data and estimate the equations to identify how di¤erent route features (distance, demand,
and the proportion of business and leisure travelers) inuence the type of airline service that
dominates thin routes.
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis uses route-level data from the US and the EU for 2009. We draw on data
for all routes served in continental US where both airports (origin and destination) are located in
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). We exclude airports located in Micropolitan Statistical
Areas as direct comparison with their European counterparts is not as straightforward. In the
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EU, we have data for all routes served by direct ights from the ten largest countries in terms
of their air tra¢ c volume to all European destinations (EU-27 + Switzerland and Norway).
The ten countries are the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden, Greece, and Ireland. For the remaining European countries, a very high
proportion of tra¢ c takes o¤ and lands at their largest airport. In both the US and EU
markets, about a third of all routes have at least one hub airport as one of their endpoints,
while about half of the routes are monopoly routes.
Since our focus here is thin routes,9 we use a subset of the routes for which we have data,
so that the eventual sample used in our empirical analysis is restricted to monopoly routes
that do not have a network airline hub as an endpoint.10 Proceeding in this way, we exclude
the densest routes in the US and EU markets from our empirical analysis. Our nal sample
comprises 1918 US routes and 1084 European routes.11
Monopoly routes are considered to be those for which the dominant airline enjoys a market
share of over 90% in terms of total annual seats, while network airlines are understood to be
those carriers that, in 2009, belonged to an international alliance (i.e., Oneworld, Star Alliance,
and SkyTeam). Today, the amount of connecting tra¢ c that can be channeled by an airline
not involved in an international alliance is necessarily modest. By adopting this criterion, we
are able to avoid the complex task of having to drawing up a list of low-cost carriers without
comprehensive data regarding airline costs.
Most non-network airlines can be considered as low-cost carriers (both in the US and in
the EU), which are either independent or subsidiaries of network airlines. Low-cost carriers
have been able to exploit cost advantages on point-to-point routes by implementing a model
based on a high utilization of aircraft and crews, lower labor costs, lower airport charges and
9We exclude data for airlines that o¤er a ight frequency of less than 52 services per year on a particular
route: operations with less than one ight per week should not be considered as scheduled.
10Hub airports in the US are the following: Atlanta (ATL), Charlotte (CLT), Chicago (ORD), Cincinnati
(CVG), Cleveland (CLE), Dallas (DFW), Denver (DEN), Detroit (DTW), Washington Dulles (IAD), Houston
(IAH), Memphis (MEM), Miami (MIA), Minneapolis (MSP), Los Angeles (LAX), New York (JFK and EWR),
Philadelphia (PHL), Phoenix (PHX), San Francisco (SFO), and Salt Lake City (SLC). Hub airports in the
EU are the following: Amsterdam (AMS), Budapest (BUD), Copenhagen (CPH), Frankfurt (FRA), Helsinki
(HEL), London (LHR), Madrid (MAD), Munich (MUC), Paris (CDG and ORY), Prague (PRG), Rome (FCO),
Vienna (VIE), and Zurich (ZRH).
11Note that we do not treat airline services in di¤erent directions on a given route as separate observations
as this would overlook the fact that airline supply must be identical, or nearly identical, in both directions of
the route. Thus, we consider the link with the origin in the largest airport. For example, on the route Saint
Louis-Akron-Saint Louis, we consider the link Saint Louis-Akron but not the link Akron-Saint Louis.
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a simpler management model (e.g., just one type of plane, a single-fare class, no free on-board
frills, etc.).
We consider as regional services the ones where regional aircraft (either turboprops or
regional jets) are used. It is important to note that network airlines can provide regional
services either directly or by means of a subsidiary or partner airline.12 But on routes where
regional aircraft are dominant, as the dataset allocates these ights to a network carrier, we are
unable to determine whether the services are provided by a regional carrier that is a subsidiary
of the network airline, or by an independent regional carrier that has signed a contract with
the network airline.
Airline supply data (frequencies, type of aircraft and total number of seats) for each route
both in the US and the EU have been obtained from RDC aviation (capstats statistics). As for
aircraft type, the most frequently used turboprops in our sample are the following: ATR 42/72,
British Aerospace ATP, De Havilland DHC-8, Embraer 120, Fairchild Dornier 328, Fokker 50,
Saab 340/2000; while the most frequently used regional jets are: Avro RJ 70/85/100, BAe 146,
Canadian Regional Jet, Embraer RJ 135/140/145/270/175/190/195, Fokker 70/100. Finally,
the most frequently used mainline jets in our sample are the following: Airbus 318/319/320/321,
Boeing 717/737/757, and MD 80/90.
In the case of the US, data for population and gross domestic product per capita of route
endpoints refer to the MSA and the information has been obtained from the US census. In the
case of the EU, these data refer to the NUTS 3 regions (the statistical unit used by Eurostat) and
have been provided by Cambridge Econometrics (European Regional Database publication).
Data on route distance are taken from the O¢ cial Airline Guide (OAG) and the webyer
website.13
Our analysis also seeks to identify those routes with the highest proportions of tourist
travelers. In the EU, all airports on the following islands are considered tourist destinations:
the Balearic and Canary Islands (Spain), Sardinia and Sicily (Italy), Corsica (France), and many
Greek islands, together with the airports of Alicante (ALC), Faro (FAO), Malaga (AGP), Nice
(NCE) and Saint Tropez (LTT). In the US, it is less clear which airports are located in what
might be deemed exclusively tourist destinations. According to data from the US Department
of Commerce (2010), among the top 20 tourist destinations, only Orlando, Las Vegas, and Gran
12Decisions of this type lie beyond the scope of this paper. Forbes and Lederman (2009) examine the
conditions under which major airlines in the US provide regional air services either using vertically integrated
carriers or via contracts with independent regional carriers. They nd that major airlines are likely to rely on
trusted regional subsidiaries on those routes where schedule disruptions are costly and likely to occur.
13See http://webyer.com.
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Canyon have a high tourism intensity (i.e., their rate of international visitors per capita is higher
than one). In fact, Brueckner and Pai (2009) only consider Las Vegas, Orlando, and two ski
resorts as tourist destinations. In this empirical analysis, we consider as tourist destinations
the airports of Las Vegas (LAS), Orlando (MCO), Grand Canyon (FLG), Spokane (GEG), Vail
(EGE), and certain coastal cities in Florida and California, which are the two most popular
states for tourism in the US. Some ski resort airports (such as Aspen) are not included in our
sample because they are located in Micropolitan Statistical Areas.
Additionally, we constructed an airport access variable that measures the distance between
the airport and the city center using Google Maps. In most cases, the identity of the relevant
city was self-evident. However, for airports between cities, we calculated the distance from the
airport to the closest city with more than 100; 000 inhabitants. The airport access variable may
inuence the proportion of business travelers on a route, as they are highly sensitive to trip
time and, so, airports at some distance from the city center will be less attractive for them.
Table 2 shows some of the features of the endpoints in our sample. The mean number of
seats o¤ered by airlines in the US is low compared to those o¤ered by their EU counterparts,
while the variability over this mean is higher. In per capita terms, European airlines o¤er
much more capacity than their American counterparts. The total number of seats o¤ered by
an airline on a route can be considered as a proxy for demand because the variability in the
load factor is typically low.14 However, airlines are required to o¤er services with some degree
of excess capacity. Our data suggest that excess capacity may be higher in the case of European
airlines.
Routes in the US are, on average, longer than those in the EU. In fact, 86% of monopoly
routes in the US exceed 400 miles, while this percentage stands at just 67% in the EU. Airports
are slightly more distant from the city center in the EU, but the proportion of tourist routes is
quite similar.
 Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 shows the airlines that control the highest number of routes in our sample, both
for the US and the EU. Network carriers and their regional services (which are operated either
by independent carriers with contracts or by subsidiaries) dominate many routes in the US
market. However, Southwest and, to lesser extent, Allegiant Air, also operate on a signicant
number of routes.
The European market is much more fragmented with a higher presence of low-cost carriers.
14However, the total number of seats is not a good proxy for demand on routes where there is a high
proportion of connecting tra¢ c.
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Ryanair monopolizes one third of the routes and the three largest low-cost carriers monopolize
45% of the routes. The role of network carriers (including their regional services) is more modest
in the EU compared to the situation in the US. The Herndahl-Hirschman index, computed as
the sum of shares of each airline in terms of the proportion of total routes that they monopolize,
is lower in the EU (0:13) than in the US (0:18), in spite of the marked presence of Ryanair.
 Insert Table 3 here 
Next, we examine the type of aircraft that is used most frequently by the dominant airlines
of each of the routes included in our sample. Then we analyze whether network carriers or
low-cost carriers dominate the thin routes of our sample.
3.2 Regional services
Fig. 3 shows the proportion of routes that are served by the di¤erent types of aircraft (i.e.,
turboprops, regional jets and mainline jets) both in the US and the EU. We focus our attention
on routes shorter than 1500 miles as neither turboprops nor regional jets can be used on routes
beyond this threshold distance. In fact, the distance range of turboprops is less than 1000
miles.
Fig. 3 indicates that regional jets are used notably more in the US than they are in the
EU: regional jets dominate about 45% of routes in the US and account for just 12% of routes
in the EU. Although turboprops are still important in the EU, where they are dominant on
19% of routes, their presence is much more modest in the US where they dominate just on 7%
of routes.
 Insert Fig. 3 here 
Figs. 4 and 5 show the use of the three types of aircraft for di¤erent distance ranges on
American and European routes, respectively. On very short-haul routes (shorter than 400
miles), turboprops are the most frequent type of aircraft used in the EU and they are also
frequently used in the US. Importantly, regional jets are the most frequently used type of
aircraft in the US on routes shorter than 800 miles and they are also used regularly on routes
within the 800 to 1200-mile distance range. Mainline jets are clearly dominant in the EU on
routes longer than 400 miles, while in the US they are only dominant on routes that exceed
1200 miles.
The fact that in the EU turboprops are still used more frequently than regional jets could be
a possible explanation for the considerably lower presence of regional aircraft on routes longer
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than 400 miles (compared to the situation in the US). An important advantage of regional jets
in relation to turboprops is that they enable airlines to provide services on thin routes that are
too long for surface transportation modes. Indeed, the provision of air services on thin routes
may be particularly relevant on routes longer than 400 miles where intermodal competition is
soft or even non-existent.
Note that the highest number of routes in our sample falls within the 400 to 800-mile
distance range. Intermodal competition may be ercer on shorter routes, and network airlines
may prefer to provide indirect services (via their hub airports) on longer routes.
 Insert Figs. 4 and 5 here 
Along with this exploratory analysis of data, we implement a multivariate analysis to iden-
tify the inuence of several route characteristics (i.e., distance, tra¢ c density, and proportion
of leisure travelers) on the likelihood that regional airlines (either with regional jets or with
turboprops) provide services on thin routes. To this end, we estimate the following equation
for any route k
Type_aircraftk = + 1Distk + 2Seatsk + 3D
tourism
k + 4Dist_city_centerk + "k. (8)
Note that di¤erent types of aircraft may be used on the same route. Hence, we need to
compute the market share of all aircraft of the same category used on any given route (i.e.,
turboprops, regional jets, and mainline jets) in terms of the total number of seats. A discrete
variable for the type of aircraft used is constructed as the dependent variable (Type_aircraftk).
This variable takes a value of zero for routes where regional jets have the largest market share
(which will be the reference case), a value of one for routes where turboprops have the largest
market share, and a value of two for routes where mainline jets have the largest market share.
Usually the market share of the dominant category of aircraft is well over 50%.
We consider the following exogenous explanatory variables of the type of aircraft used by
the airlines.
1. Distk: Number of miles own to link the endpoints of the route. The cost superiority of
mainline jets in relation to regional jets increases with distance, while on very short-haul
routes turboprops are less costly than regional jets. Thus, as route distance increases, we
can expect regional jets to be used less intensely than mainline jets. Furthermore, the
longer range capability of regional jets with respect to that of turboprops yields a clear
prediction as regards the expected e¤ect of the distance variable: turboprops should be
used less intensely on longer routes.
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2. Seatsk: Total number of seats o¤ered on the route. This variable may work as a proxy
for demand.
The simultaneous determination by airlines of the type of aircraft and the number of
seats could imply an endogeneity bias in the estimation. Hence, we apply an instrumental
variables procedure to correct for any possible bias. We use the following instruments of
the seats variable:
 Popk: Weighted average of population in the routes origin and destination regions.
 GDPCk: Weighted average of GDP per capita in the routes origin and destination
regions, with weights based on population.
Tra¢ c density should be higher in more populated and richer endpoints. Thus, we argue
that population and GDP are suitable instruments for the seats variable. Indeed, these
two variables are clearly exogenous but, at the same time, they are correlated with the
number of seats (these correlations are within the range 20-30% for both variables).
Results for the Seatsk variable are the main point of interest in our analysis. The ques-
tion remains as to whether regional services will be used more intensely on thinner routes,
taking into account that our sample already excludes the densest routes. We seek to de-
termine whether regional jets are mainly used to provide services on thin routes. Looking
at the data, we can expect di¤erences between the EU and the US markets.
3. Dtourismk : Dummy variable that takes the value of one for those routes where at least one
of the endpoints is a major tourist destination. The proportion of leisure travelers should
be higher on routes that have tourist destinations as endpoints. Thus, regional services
(either regional jets or turboprops) should be used more intensely on non-tourist routes
with a higher proportion of business travelers because they yield a higher frequency of
services (at higher fares).
4. Dist_city_centerk: sum of the distances between the origin and the destination city
centers and their respective airports. The proportion of leisure travelers should be higher
on routes where airports are further from the city center. As a consequence, regional
services should be used more intensely on routes with airports located closer to the city
center where the proportion of business travelers is higher.
The estimation is made using a multinomial probit where the use of regional jets is the
reference case. A higher value for the corresponding explanatory variable means that the use
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of regional jets is more (less) likely if the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with this variable is
negative (positive).
In Appendix B, we show the results of the estimates of Eq. (8) for the whole sample of
routes. In this regression, we include a dummy variable for routes from the US, and our interest
lies precisely in this dummy variable. The results conrm what we have seen in the exploratory
analysis of the data: regional jets are used more intensely in the US because the coe¢ cient
associated with this variable is negative and statistically signicant when we consider the choice
of both turboprops and mainline jets with respect to regional jets. The predicted decrease in
the probability of using mainline jets in relation to regional jets is 40% when we move from the
EU to the US market.
The Chow test advises in favor of separate estimations for the EU and the US. Tables 4 and
5 show the results of these separate estimations. The rst two columns of both tables show
the coe¢ cients estimated and their respective standard errors. The last two columns show
the predicted change required in the probability for an outcome to take place (i.e., the use of
regional jets as opposed to either turboprops or mainline jets) as each independent variable
changes from its minimum to maximum value (i.e., from 0 to 1 for discrete variables), while all
other independent variables are held constant at their mean values. The results in the rst two
columns report the statistical signicance of the relationships considered, while the results in
the last two columns report the quantitative impact of each explanatory variable. Recall that
the estimation is based on routes shorter than 1500 miles.
 Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
As may be expected, regional jets are used more intensely on longer routes in comparison
with the use made of turboprops, whereas the former are used more frequently on shorter routes
than mainline jets. This nding holds for both the US and the EU. The impact of the distance
variable is especially important: the predicted increase in the probability of using mainline
jets as opposed to regional jets as distance shifts from its minimum to its maximum value is
about 80-90%, while the predicted decrease in the probability of using turboprops as opposed
to regional jets is about 60-80%.
Regional jets are used on thinner routes in the American market. Indeed, regional jets are
more likely to be used by US carriers on routes with a lower number of seats. The coe¢ cient
associated with the seats variable is positive and statistically signicant when analyzing the
choice of both turboprops and mainline jets in relation to regional jets. However, the impact
in terms of probabilities is only strong when analyzing the choice of mainline jets in relation to
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regional jets: the predicted increase in the probability of using mainline jets as the number of
seats shifts from its minimum to its maximum value is about 54%.
The results for the EU market are less clear. The coe¢ cient associated with the seats
variable is negative and statistically signicant when analyzing the choice of turboprops in
relation to regional jets. Nevertheless, we do not nd any substantial di¤erences with respect
to the number of seats in the choice of mainline jets in relation to regional jets. The e¤ect of
the seats variable in terms of the predicted probabilities is modest in both cases.
Therefore, we nd marked di¤erences between the EU and the US markets in their respective
uses of regional jets: while these jets are not used more intensely on thinner routes in the EU
market, they clearly are in the US.
Furthermore, we nd clear evidence that regional jets are used more frequently on routes
with a higher proportion of business travelers in the US. Mainline jets (in relation to regional
jets) are used more intensely on routes with tourist destinations and with airports that are lo-
cated at a greater distance from the city center. The coe¢ cients associated with these variables
are positive and statistically signicant, and the predicted increase in probabilities is high. As
expected, we do not nd substantial di¤erences in terms of the predicted variation in proba-
bilities in the analysis of the choice of turboprops in relation to regional jets. Both types of
aircraft should be used more frequently on routes with a higher proportion of business travelers
because of the frequency advantage they provide over mainline jets.
The results for the EU indicate that mainline jets (in comparison to regional jets) are
used more often on routes where airports are located some distance from the city center. The
predicted increase in probabilities is about 33%. The variable for tourist destinations is not
relevant from a statistical or from an economic point of view.
Our data show that US airlines usually prefer to employ regional jets on routes with a 400
to 800-mile distance range, which is the range with the highest number of routes in our sample.
Regional jets in the US market seem to be particularly suited to providing services on the
thinnest routes, as well as on routes with a relatively high proportion of business travelers. In
the EU, however, it seems that airlines have yet to adopt the advantages of regional jets for
the provision of services on thin and relatively long routes.
3.3 Low-cost services
Here we focus our attention on examining the type of airline (be it network or low-cost) that
provides services on thin routes. From the previous analysis, in the US it is clear that regional
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airlines (either subsidiaries of network airlines or independent carriers) dominate a vast number
of routes that do not exceed 800 miles, whereas in the EU mainline jets (used by network or
low-cost airlines) are dominant. Recall that we consider network airlines to be those that form
part of an international alliance (e.g., Oneworld, Star Alliance or SkyTeam).
 Insert Fig. 6 here 
Fig. 6 shows the airline business model that predominates on monopoly routes both in
the US and the EU. Airlines not involved in international alliances dominate a vast number of
monopoly routes in the EU. Di¤erently, network carriers in the US (either using mainline or
regional aircraft) have a dominant role in the provision of services on monopoly routes.
As in the previous analysis of the use of regional services, we undertake a multivariate
analysis to identify when it is more likely for a low-cost airline to be dominant in our sample
of thin routes. Hence, we estimate the following equations for any route k
Dlow_cost = + 1Distk + 2Seatsk + 3D
tourism
k + 4Dist_city_centerk + "k, (9)
where the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of one on routes dominated
by non-network airlines (generally low-cost airlines) and the value of zero on routes dominated
by network airlines.
We use the same explanatory variables as in the Eq. (8), including distance, number of seats
and variables for the proportion of leisure travelers (i.e., tourist destinations and distance from
the airport to the city center). As in Eq. (8), we implement an instrumental variables procedure
where the instruments of the variable Seatsk are population (Popk) and gross domestic product
per capita (GDPCk) of the route endpoints.
We can expect low-cost airlines to dominate longer thin routes because network airlines
may prefer to provide an indirect service (through hub airports) in city-pair markets where the
route distance is su¢ ciently high. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis conducted
in Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2011). Additionally, low-cost airlines may dominate routes with
a high proportion of leisure travelers (i.e., routes from/to tourist destinations and routes with
airports some distance from the city center). In this context, we wish to examine whether
low-cost airlines provide services on routes with a relatively low number of seats.
The estimation is made using the probit technique. A higher value of the corresponding
explanatory variable would mean that low-cost airlines are more (less) likely to dominate the
route if the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with this variable is positive (negative).
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In Appendix B, we show the results of the estimates of Eq. (9) for the whole sample of
routes. These results conrm what we have seen in the exploratory analysis of the data: the
likelihood of a low-cost carrier monopolizing a route is higher in the European market than in
the US market. The predicted increase in the probability of using low-cost carriers as opposed
to network carriers is 55% when we shift from the US to the EU market.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the estimation of Eq. (9) for the US and the EU
samples, respectively. The rst column of both tables shows the coe¢ cients estimated and
their respective standard errors. The second one provides the predicted change required in the
probability for an outcome to take place (i.e., the use of a low-cost airline as opposed to that of
a network airline) as each independent variable changes from its minimum to maximum value
(i.e., from 0 to 1 for discrete variables), while all other independent variables are held constant
at their mean values.
 Insert Tables 6 and 7 here 
We nd a higher presence of low-cost carriers on longer routes in the US market. The
coe¢ cient associated with the distance variable is positive and statistically signicant and the
change in the predicted probabilities is about 78%. However, the interpretation of these results
is less clear in the EU market: although the coe¢ cient associated with the distance variable is
positive and statistically signicant, the change in the predicted probabilities is small.
Our results indicate a higher presence of low-cost airlines on denser routes in the US market.
Indeed, it is more likely that a low-cost airline dominates a route when the total number of seats
o¤ered is higher. The coe¢ cient associated with the seats variable is positive and statistically
signicant. The predicted increase in probabilities is about 41%. Our results suggest that some
low-cost carriers prefer to provide services on denser routes (as is the case of Southwest, for
example).15
By contrast, European low-cost airlines dominate routes with a lower number of seats. The
coe¢ cient associated with the seats variable is negative and statistically signicant and the
predicted decrease in probabilities is about 36%. Hence, we conclude that European low-cost
carriers prefer to serve thinner routes (as is the case of Ryanair, for example).
In the US, the coe¢ cients associated with the variables of tourism and distance to the city
center are both positive and statistically signicant. The predicted increase in probabilities is
about 23 and 53% respectively. Therefore, low-cost airlines are more likely to dominate a route
when the proportion of leisure travelers is higher.
15This is consistent with the analysis in Bogulaski et al. (2004), which shows that Southwest prefers to
operate on high-density routes.
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In the EU, the presence of low-cost airlines is also higher on routes with airports further
from the city center, and the expected increase in probabilities is about 21%. However, the
coe¢ cient associated with the variable of tourism is not statistically signicant and the change
in probabilities is minimal. Overall, our results suggest that low-cost airlines in the EU are
more likely to o¤er services from secondary airports at some distance from large cities, but not
necessarily in major tourist destinations.16
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper has examined the provision of air services on thin routes by comparing the di¤erences
between the US and EU markets. We have focused specically on the impact of two major
innovations in the airline industry in recent decades: regional jet technology and the low-cost
business model. We have found evidence of very di¤erent patterns in the two markets. Our
empirical analysis indicates that low-cost airlines operate similarly to network airlines in the
US, at least in terms of route choices. Both types of airline prefer to operate on high-density
routes, while thin routes are served mainly by regional carriers using regional jet aircraft. In
addition, the emergence of regional jet technology constitutes a key innovation that has enabled
regional services to be extended to longer routes. By contrast, in the EU thin routes are mainly
operated by low-cost airlines. Therefore, only in the US market are the advantages of regional
jets on medium-haul routes fully exploited. The success enjoyed by Ryanair in the EU market,
where it operates mostly from secondary airports, could be a determining factor in our results.
Regional services allow airlines to o¤er higher ight frequency, typically employing airports
located close to city centers. Low-cost services using mainline jets allow airlines to charge
lower fares, but this is typically at the expense of a lower ight frequency and the need to use
airports located some distance from their respective city centers. Thus, the US model is more
convenient for business travelers, while the EU model is more convenient for leisure travelers.
Compared to the European market, the American market is more mature and its routes
are longer, which may help account for the success of regional jets in the US. By contrast,
turboprops remain the dominant regional aircraft in the EU. Moreover, the inuence of the
public authorities on the air transportation markets in the US and the EU di¤ers. On the one
16We consider the relevant market to be the route between two airports. A more thorough analysis would
require to consider urban areas. However, this would create additional problems, not the least of which is
establishing the limit of each urban area, and determining the market structure in each city-pair market given
that airlines operating on di¤erent routes in the same market may compete imperfectly.
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hand, the US government implemented a program known as Essential Air Services following
liberalization in the late-1970s, which subsidized routes run by airlines connecting small com-
munities with the nearest large airport (Metrass-Mendes and Neufville, 2010). Clearly, tra¢ c
density on routes with these small communities as an endpoint is very low. This guarantee of
air services refers in all instances to very short-haul routes that typically connect the airports of
Micropolitan Statistical Areas with hub airports. Thus, very few subsidized routes are included
in our US sample.
By contrast, several European governments have imposed Public Service Obligations on
certain routes via the regulation of fares, frequencies, and market access (Williams and Pagliari,
2004; Calzada and Fageda, 2010). However, many of these are applied not to thin routes
but rather to routes connecting airports in isolated locations (islands). Moreover, the public
authorities have played an active role in the success of Ryanair by o¤ering either discounts in
airport charges or direct subsidies. This may have had an inuence in the dominance enjoyed
by low-cost airlines in Europe. As a result, fares on thin routes may be lower in the EU than
in the US, but this places an additional burden on public resources.
Furthermore, the di¤erent use of regional jets in the US and the EU may also be explained
by the existence of slot controls in Europe. In the US, airlines typically sign contracts with
airport authorities to regulate the access to the infrastructure and they do not need to own slots.
Nevertheless, the access of airlines to airports in Europe is based on slot allocation rules like
grandfather rights(i.e., an operator who currently uses a slot can retain the slot each period)
or use-it-or-lose-it rules (i.e., airlines must operate slots as allocated by the coordinator at
least 80% of the time during a season to retain historic rights to the slots). Hence, the use of
larger aircraft with lower ight frequency may constitute a better strategy in a slot-constrained
European environment.
In conclusion, our analysis has shown that travelers ying on thin routes benet from the two
key innovations examined here in the air transport industry, but that signicant di¤erences are
to be found in the US and EU markets. Further research should provide a fuller understanding
of these di¤erences.
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Figures and Tables
Fig. 1: Utilities
Fig. 2: The f solution
25
Fig. 3: Regional services on routes shorter than 1500 miles
Note 1: TP are turboprops, RJ are regional jets, and JETS are mainline jets.
Note 2: Number of US routes=1584; Number of EU routes=1718.
26
Fig. 4: Regional services by distance (US sample)
Note 1: TP are turboprops, RJ are regional jets, and JETS are mainline jets.
Note 2: Distance in miles. Number of routes by distance: < 400 miles: 268;
400-800 miles: 670; 800-1200 miles: 486; 1200-1500 miles: 156.
27
Fig. 5: Regional services by distance (EU sample)
Note 1: TP are turboprops, RJ are regional jets, and JETS are mainline jets.
Note 2: Distance in miles. Number of routes by distance: < 400 miles: 599;
400-800 miles: 641; 800-1200 miles: 400; 1200-1500 miles: 78.
28
Fig. 6: Low-cost services
Note 1: Number of US routes=1918; Number of EU routes=1804.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
From Eq. (7), let us dene 
  Cf    Lf  = 0, that is

 =
2d(TV   d)

f 3   [(1  )(TV   d)  V ] f + V = 0. (A1)
The total di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to a parameter x is df

dx
=
 @
=@x
@
=@f
. Notice that @
=@f = slope (Cf )  slope (Lf ), and thus @
=@f > 0 because at the
equilibrium frequency the slope of Cf  exceeds the slope of Lf . Therefore, we just need to
explore the sign of @
=@x.
 @
=@ = (TV   d) > 0 since T > d=V is assumed to hold. Then df
d
< 0.
 @
=@ = 2d(TV d)

f 3 > 0 since T > d=V is assumed to hold. Then df

d
< 0.
 @
=@ = V f > 0. Then df
d
< 0.
 @
=@d = 2(TV 2d)

f 3 + (1   )f and, plugging Eq. (A1) into the derivative, we obtain
@
=@d = 2(TV d)

f 3 + +f
(TV d)V that is positive because T > d=V is assumed to hold.
Then df

dd
< 0.
 @
=@ =  2d(TV d)
2
f 3 + V < 0 since T > d=V is assumed to hold. Then df

d
> 0.
 @
=@T = 2dV

f 3   (1  )V f , so that @
=@T < 0 requires f 2 < (1 )
2d
. Then using Eq.
(6) this inequality becomes pair < 12(1   ) (T   d=V ) +  , and nally using Eq. (5) we
obtain  =f <  , which is always true. Therefore, @
=@T < 0 and thus df
dT
> 0.
 @
=@V = 2dT

f 3   (1   )Tf + f +  and, using Eq. (A1), this expression can be
rewritten as @
=@V =  TV (+f)
TV d + f +, so that @
=@V < 0 requires  =f <  , which
is always true. Therefore, @
=@V < 0 and thus df

dV
> 0. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Straightforward.
B Appendix: Estimates using the whole sample (US+EU)
34
T
ab
le
A
1
:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
u
se
of
re
gi
on
al
se
rv
ic
es
-
ro
u
te
s
<
15
00
m
il
es
-
U
S
+
E
U
M
ul
ti
no
m
ia
l
pr
ob
it
w
it
h
en
do
ge
no
us
re
gr
es
so
rs
D
ep
.
va
ri
ab
le
:
D
ep
.
va
ri
ab
le
:
R
J=
0,
T
P
=
1
R
J=
0,
JE
T
S=
2
D
is
t k
-0
.0
05
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
0.
00
21
(0
.0
00
14
)*
**
S
ea
ts
k
4.
48
e-
06
(4
.1
3e
-0
6)
0.
00
00
13
(2
.9
0e
-0
6)
**
*
D
to
u
r
is
m
k
0.
41
(0
.1
4)
**
*
0.
67
(0
.1
0)
**
*
D
is
t_
ci
ty
_
ce
n
te
r k
-0
.0
09
(0
.0
05
)*
*
0.
02
0
(0
.0
02
9)
**
*
D
U
S
k
-1
.2
6
(0
.1
2)
**
*
-1
.5
9
(0
.0
8)
**
*
C
on
st
a
n
t
2.
15
(0
.2
3)
**
*
-1
.1
1
(0
.1
6)
**
*
L
 
ps
eu
d
ol
ik
el
ih
oo
d
-2
08
6.
70

2
(j
oi
n
t
si
g
:)
12
43
.2
3*
**
N
33
01
N
ot
e
1:
T
P
ar
e
tu
rb
op
ro
ps
,
R
J
ar
e
re
gi
on
al
je
ts
,
an
d
JE
T
S
ar
e
m
ai
nl
in
e
je
ts
.
N
ot
e
2:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
(r
ob
us
t
to
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
).
N
ot
e
3:
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
1%
(*
**
),
5%
(*
*)
,
10
%
(*
).
N
ot
e
4:
T
he
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
S
ea
ts
k
ar
e
P
op
k
an
d
G
D
P
C
k
.
35
T
ab
le
A
2
:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
u
se
of
lo
w
-c
os
t
se
rv
ic
es
-
U
S
+
E
U
P
ro
bi
t
w
it
h
en
do
ge
no
us
re
gr
es
so
rs
D
ep
.
va
ri
ab
le
:
ne
tw
or
k
ai
rl
in
e=
0,
lo
w
-c
os
t
ai
rl
in
e=
1
C
oe
¢
ci
en
t
C
ha
ng
e
in
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
D
is
t k
0.
00
06
6
(0
.0
00
05
)*
**
36
.7
4%
S
ea
ts
k
6.
87
e-
06
(1
.9
3e
-0
6)
**
*
26
.9
1%
D
to
u
r
is
m
k
0.
52
(0
.0
7)
**
*
17
.8
7%
D
is
t_
ci
ty
_
ce
n
te
r k
0.
01
(0
.0
02
)*
**
54
.6
1%
D
U
S
k
-1
.6
9
(0
.0
6)
**
*
-5
5.
77
%
C
on
st
a
n
t
0.
14
(0
.0
9)
*
 
L
 
ps
eu
d
ol
ik
el
ih
oo
d
-4
6,
89
8.
26

2
(j
oi
n
t
si
g
:)
11
70
.5
0*
**
N
37
22
N
ot
e
1:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
(r
ob
us
t
to
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
).
N
ot
e
2:
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
1%
(*
**
),
5%
(*
*)
,
10
%
(*
).
N
ot
e
3:
T
he
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
S
ea
ts
k
ar
e
P
op
k
an
d
G
D
P
C
k
.
36
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 40 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 40 
 
 
 
 
40
Llista Document de Treball  
List Working Paper 
 
WP 2011/23 “Air services on thin routes: Regional versus low-cost airlines” Fageda, X. and Flores-Fillol, R. 
WP 2011/22 “Measuring early childhood health: a composite index comparing Colombian departments” Osorio, 
A.M.; Bolancé, C. and Alcañiz, M. 
WP 2011/21 “A relational approach to the geography of innovation: a typology of regions” Moreno, R. and 
Miguélez, E. 
WP 2011/20 “Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?” Jiménez, J.L and Perdiguero, J. 
WP 2011/19 “Factors affecting hospital admission and recovery stay duration of in-patient motor victims in 
Spain” Santolino, M.; Bolancé, C. and Alcañiz, M. 
WP 2011/18 “Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis” Bel, G.; 
Fageda, X. and Mur, M. 
WP 2011/17 “The "farthest" need the best. Human capital composition and development-specific economic 
growth” Manca, F. 
WP 2011/16 “Causality and contagion in peripheral EMU public debt markets: a dynamic approach” Gómez-Puig, 
M. and Sosvilla-Rivero, S. 
WP 2011/15 “The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to multi-
categorical selection” Santolino, M. and Söderberg, M.  
WP 2011/14 “Agglomeration, Inequality and Economic Growth: Cross-section and panel data analysis” Castells, 
D.  
WP 2011/13 “A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement 
estimation” Bermúdez, L.; Ferri, A. and Guillén, M.  
WP 2011/12 “Assessing agglomeration economies in a spatial framework with endogenous regressors” Artis, 
M.J.; Miguélez, E. and Moreno, R.  
WP 2011/11 “Privatization, cooperation and costs of solid waste services in small towns” Bel, G; Fageda, X. and 
Mur, M.  
WP 2011/10 “Privatization and PPPS in transportation infrastructure: Network effects of increasing user fees”     
Albalate, D. and Bel, G.  
WP 2011/09 “Debating as a classroom tool for adapting learning outcomes to the European higher education area”     
Jiménez, J.L.; Perdiguero, J. and Suárez, A.  
WP 2011/08 “Influence of the claimant’s behavioural features on motor compensation outcomes” Ayuso, M; 
Bermúdez L. and Santolino, M.  
WP 2011/07 “Geography of talent and regional differences in Spain” Karahasan, B.C. and Kerimoglu E. 
WP 2011/06 “How Important to a City Are Tourists and Daytrippers? The Economic Impact of Tourism on The 
City of Barcelona” Murillo, J; Vayá, E; Romaní, J. and Suriñach, J.  
WP 2011/05  “Singling out individual inventors from patent data” Miguélez,E. and Gómez-Miguélez, I.  
WP 2011/04  “¿La sobreeducación de los padres afecta al rendimiento académico de sus hijos?” Nieto, S; Ramos, 
R.  
WP 2011/03  “The Transatlantic Productivity Gap: Is R&D the Main Culprit?” Ortega-Argilés, R.; Piva, M.; and 
Vivarelli, M.  
WP 2011/02  “The Spatial Distribution of Human Capital: Can It Really Be Explained by Regional Differences in 
Market Access?” Karahasan, B.C. and López-Bazo, E 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 41 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 41 
 
 
 
 
41
WP 2011/01  “If you want me to stay, pay” . Claeys, P and Martire, F 
WP 2010/16  “Infrastructure and nation building: The regulation and financing of network transportation 
infrastructures in Spain (1720-2010)”Bel,G 
WP 2010/15  “Fiscal policy and economic stability: does PIGS stand for Procyclicality In Government Spending?”   
Maravalle, A ; Claeys, P. 
WP 2010/14  “Economic and social convergence in Colombia”  Royuela, V;  Adolfo García, G. 
WP 2010/13  “Symmetric or asymmetric gasoline prices? A meta-analysis approach” Perdiguero, J. 
WP 2010/12  “Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals” Fageda,X  and Fiz, E. 
WP 2010/11  “Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population” Bolancé, C; 
Alemany, R ; and Guillén M 
WP 2010/10   “On the Dynamics of Exports and FDI: The Spanish Internationalization Process” Martínez-Martín, 
J. 
WP 2010/09   “Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona” Albalate, D ;  Bel, G and Calzada, J. 
WP 2010/08  “Cómo (no) adaptar una asignatura al EEES: Lecciones desde la experiencia comparada en España” 
Florido C. ; Jiménez JL.  and  Perdiguero J. 
WP 2010/07 “Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-
cost carrier” Fageda, X ; Jiménez J.L. ; Perdiguero , J. 
WP 2010/06  “La reforma de la contratación en el mercado de trabajo: entre la flexibilidad y la seguridad” 
Royuela V. and Manuel Sanchis M. 
WP 2010/05 “Discrete distributions when modeling the disability severity score of motor victims” Boucher, J and 
Santolino, M 
WP 2010/04  “Does privatization spur regulation? Evidence from the regulatory reform of European airports . Bel, 
G. and Fageda, X.” 
WP  2010/03   “High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad”. Albalate, D ;  and Bel, G.” 
WP  2010/02   “Speed limit laws in America: Economics, politics and geography”. Albalate, D ; and Bel, G.” 
WP  2010/01   “Research Networks and Inventors’ Mobility as Drivers of Innovation: Evidence from Europe” 
Miguélez, E. ;  Moreno, R. ” 
WP 2009/26   ”Social Preferences and Transport Policy: The case of US speed limits” Albalate, D.  
WP 2009/25   ”Human Capital Spillovers Productivity and Regional Convergence in Spain” , Ramos, R ; Artis, M.; 
Suriñach, J.  
WP 2009/24  “Human Capital and Regional Wage Gaps” ,López-Bazo,E. Motellón E.  
WP 2009/23  “Is Private Production of Public Services Cheaper than Public Production? A meta-regression 
analysis of solid waste and water services” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.; Warner. M.E. 
WP 2009/22  “Institutional Determinants of Military Spending” Bel, G., Elias-Moreno, F. 
WP 2009/21  “Fiscal Regime Shifts in Portugal” Afonso, A., Claeys, P., Sousa, R.M. 
WP 2009/20  “Health care utilization among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European countries. 
Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe” Solé-Auró, A., Guillén, M., 
Crimmins, E.M. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 42 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 42 
 
 
 
 
42
WP 2009/19  “La efectividad de las políticas activas de mercado de trabajo para luchar contra el paro. La 
experiencia de Cataluña” Ramos, R., Suriñach, J., Artís, M.  
WP 2009/18  “Is the Wage Curve Formal or Informal? Evidence for Colombia” Ramos, R., Duque, J.C., Suriñach, 
J. 
WP 2009/17  “General Equilibrium Long-Run Determinants for Spanish FDI: A Spatial Panel Data Approach” 
Martínez-Martín, J.  
WP 2009/16  “Scientists on the move: tracing scientists’ mobility and its spatial distribution” Miguélez, E.; 
Moreno, R.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2009/15  “The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-1950 
Puerto Rico” Bel, G. 
WP 2009/14  “Appropriate IPRs, Human Capital Composition and Economic Growth” Manca, F. 
WP 2009/13  “Human Capital Composition and Economic Growth at a Regional Level” Manca, F. 
WP 2009/12  “Technology Catching-up and the Role of Institutions” Manca, F.  
WP 2009/11  “A missing spatial link in institutional quality” Claeys, P.; Manca, F. 
WP 2009/10  “Tourism and Exports as a means of Growth” Cortés-Jiménez, I.; Pulina, M.; Riera i Prunera, C.; 
Artís, M. 
WP 2009/09  “Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms' innovative performance” Ortega-Argilés, R.; 
Moreno, R. 
WP 2009/08  “¿Por qué se privatizan servicios en los municipios (pequeños)? Evidencia empírica sobre residuos 
sólidos y agua” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.; Mur, M. 
WP 2009/07  “Empirical analysis of solid management waste costs: Some evidence from Galicia, Spain” Bel, 
G.; Fageda, X. 
WP 2009/06  “Intercontinental fligths from European Airports: Towards hub concentration or not?” Bel, G.; 
Fageda, X. 
WP 2009/05 “Factors explaining urban transport systems in large European cities: A cross-sectional approach” 
Albalate, D.; Bel, G. 
WP 2009/04  “Regional economic growth and human capital: the role of overeducation” Ramos, R.; Suriñach, 
J.; Artís, M. 
WP 2009/03  “Regional heterogeneity in wage distributions. Evidence from Spain” Motellón, E.; López-Bazo, E.; 
El-Attar, M. 
WP 2009/02  “Modelling the disability severity score in motor insurance claims: an application to the Spanish 
case” Santolino, M.; Boucher, J.P. 
WP 2009/01  “Quality in work and aggregate productivity” Royuela, V.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2008/16  “Intermunicipal cooperation and privatization of solid waste services among small municipalities in 
Spain” Bel, G.; Mur, M. 
WP 2008/15 “Similar problems, different solutions: Comparing refuse collection in the Netherlands and Spain” 
Bel, G.; Dijkgraaf, E.; Fageda, X.; Gradus, R. 
WP 2008/14  “Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury settlements awarded by Spanish 
trial courts” Santolino, M 
WP 2008/13  “Does social capital reinforce technological inputs in the creation of knowledge? Evidence from the 
Spanish regions” Miguélez, E.; Moreno, R.; Artís, M. 
WP 2008/12  “Testing the FTPL across government tiers” Claeys, P.; Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 43 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 43 
 
 
 
 
43
WP 2008/11  “Internet Banking in Europe: a comparative analysis” Arnaboldi, F.; Claeys, P. 
WP 2008/10  “Fiscal policy and interest rates: the role of financial and economic integration” Claeys, P.; Moreno, 
R.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2008/09  “Health of Immigrants in European countries” Solé-Auró, A.; M.Crimmins, E. 
WP 2008/08  “The Role of Firm Size in Training Provision Decisions: evidence from Spain” Castany, L. 
WP 2008/07  “Forecasting the maximum compensation offer in the automobile BI claims negotiation process” 
Ayuso, M.; Santolino, M. 
WP 2008/06  “Prediction of individual automobile RBNS claim reserves in the context of Solvency II” Ayuso, M.; 
Santolino, M.  
WP 2008/05  “Panel Data Stochastic Convergence Analysis of the Mexican Regions” Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L.; 
German-Soto, V. 
WP 2008/04  “Local privatization, intermunicipal cooperation, transaction costs and political interests: Evidence 
from Spain” Bel, G.; Fageda, X. 
WP 2008/03  “Choosing hybrid organizations for local services delivery: An empirical analysis of partial 
privatization” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.  
WP 2008/02  “Motorways, tolls and road safety. Evidence from European Panel Data” Albalate, D.; Bel, G. 
WP 2008/01  “Shaping urban traffic patterns through congestion charging: What factors drive success or failure?” 
Albalate, D.; Bel, G. 
WP 2007/19  “La distribución regional de la temporalidad en España. Análisis de sus determinantes” Motellón, E. 
WP 2007/18  “Regional returns to physical capital: are they conditioned by educational attainment?” López-Bazo, 
E.; Moreno, R. 
WP 2007/17  “Does human capital stimulate investment in physical capital? evidence from a cost system 
framework” López-Bazo, E.; Moreno, R. 
WP 2007/16  “Do innovation and human capital explain the productivity gap between small and large firms?” 
Castany, L.; López-Bazo, E.; Moreno, R. 
WP 2007/15  “Estimating the effects of fiscal policy under the budget constraint” Claeys, P. 
WP 2007/14  “Fiscal sustainability across government tiers: an assessment of soft budget constraints” Claeys, P.; 
Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2007/13  “The institutional vs. the academic definition of the quality of work life. What is the focus of the 
European Commission?” Royuela, V.; López-Tamayo, J.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2007/12  “Cambios en la distribución salarial en españa, 1995-2002. Efectos a través del tipo de contrato” 
Motellón, E.; López-Bazo, E.; El-Attar, M.  
WP 2007/11  “EU-15 sovereign governments’ cost of borrowing after seven years of monetary union” Gómez-
Puig, M.. 
WP 2007/10  “Another Look at the Null of Stationary Real Exchange Rates: Panel Data with Structural Breaks and 
Cross-section Dependence” Syed A. Basher; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L. 
WP 2007/09  “Multicointegration, polynomial cointegration and I(2) cointegration with structural breaks. An 
application to the sustainability of the US external deficit” Berenguer-Rico, V.; Carrion-i-Silvestre, 
J.L. 
WP 2007/08  “Has concentration evolved similarly in manufacturing and services? A sensitivity analysis” Ruiz-
Valenzuela, J.; Moreno-Serrano, R.; Vaya-Valcarce, E. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 44 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 44 
 
 
 
 
44
WP 2007/07  “Defining housing market areas using commuting and migration algorithms. Catalonia (Spain) as an 
applied case study” Royuela, C.; Vargas, M. 
WP 2007/06  “Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term 
Contracts” Albalate, D.; Bel, G. 
WP 2007/05 “Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size” Castany, L.; Lopez-Bazo, E.; 
Moreno, R. 
WP 2007/04  “Privatization and Regulation of Toll Motorways in Europe” Albalate, D.; Bel, G.; Fageda, X. 
WP 2007/03  “Is the influence of quality of life on urban growth non-stationary in space? A case study of 
Barcelona” Royuela, V.; Moreno, R.; Vayá, E.  
WP 2007/02  “Sustainability of EU fiscal policies. A panel test” Claeys, P. 
WP 2007/01  “Research networks and scientific production in Economics: The recent spanish experience” Duque, 
J.C.; Ramos, R.; Royuela, V. 
WP 2006/10  “Term structure of interest rate. European financial integration” Fontanals-Albiol, H.; Ruiz-Dotras, 
E.; Bolancé-Losilla, C. 
WP 2006/09  “Patrones de publicación internacional (ssci) de los autores afiliados a universidades españolas, en el 
ámbito económico-empresarial (1994-2004)” Suriñach, J.; Duque, J.C.; Royuela, V. 
WP 2006/08  “Supervised regionalization methods: A survey” Duque, J.C.; Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2006/07  “Against the mainstream: nazi privatization in 1930s germany” Bel, G. 
WP 2006/06  “Economía Urbana y Calidad de Vida. Una revisión del estado del conocimiento en España” 
Royuela, V.; Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B.  
WP 2006/05  “Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate” Alcañiz, M.; Costa, A.; Guillén, M.; 
Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
WP 2006/04  “Time-varying effects when analysing customer lifetime duration: application to the insurance 
market” Guillen, M.; Nielsen, J.P.; Scheike, T.; Perez-Marin, A.M. 
WP 2006/03  “Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives the european experience” Albalate, D.  
WP 2006/02  “An analysis of the determinants in economics and business publications by spanish universities 
between 1994 and 2004” Ramos, R.; Royuela, V.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2006/01  “Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: empirical evidence using microdata” Artís, M.; Ramos, R.; 
Suriñach, J. 
 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/23 pàg. 45 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/23  pag. 45 
 
 
 
 
45
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
